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Almost a half century after the publication of the 
Philosophical Investigations, it seems important to ask why 
Wittgenstein’s ideas have had so little impact on 
contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. 
A clue can be discerned by what Georges Rey 
says in the introduction to his book on contemporary 
philosophy of mind.  Rey announces at the outset to his 
readers that his treatment of the mind aspires to be 
continuous with science, not with literature.  He explains 
that there is a recent resurgence of interest in the 
philosophy of mind with “explanatory questions” about 
what sort of thing a pain, a thought, a mental image, a 
desire, or an emotion is.  Neither materialism nor dualism 
provides a “serious” theory about the mind, which will give 
us a “serious” explanation of mental phenomena.  
According to Rey, although old-style grammatical 
investigations may have given us a “heightened sensitivity 
to complexities and nuances of our ordinary mental talk,” 
they “tended to occur at the expense of further theorizing 
about the mental phenomena themselves” (Rey, 4). 
But, as Rey acknowledges later in the book, it is 
not simply that the acquisition of a heightened sensitivity to 
the complexes and nuances of ordinary talk tended to 
occur at the expense of further theorizing about the nature 
of mental phenomena: it was designed to do so.  Such a 
“heightened sensitivity” was to reveal the futility of such 
further theorizing.  Wittgenstein explicitly repudiates the 
temptation to penetrate or see into phenomena.  He is also 
complains about attempts at explanation that invoke “yet 
uncomprehended processes in yet unexplored mediums.”  
As philosophers, we should be interested in the kind of 
statements we make in using mental concepts. 
Comments like this have led many contemporary 
philosophers to reject Wittgenstein’s attitude as simply 
prejudiced against scientific enquiry.  Rey parodies this 
attitude – crystallized in Wittgenstein’s dictum that 
explanations have to come to an end somewhere – by 
suggesting that   
one could… [rationally]… never ask for 
explanations of anything at all: we could just say that it is a 
natural capacity of lightning to burn what it strikes.  The 
question is whether we can also rationally ask for slightly 
deeper explanations, and, if we can, what those 
explanations might be… (p.5). 
But Wittgenstein does not simply reject scientific 
theories that are advanced about the phenomena in 
question: he disputes whether there are such phenomena 
to be so investigated.  He rejects, that is, the philosophical 
presupposition that funds the scientific programme: 
namely, that expressions containing mental verbs always 
function in the same way to pick out an independent state 
of affairs (objects, events, states, properties, or relations) 
in the first place.  This is not anti-science; it is anti-Russell 
and anti-Tractatus.  Expressions containing mental verbs 
function in various ways at various times.  To suppose that 
they always refer, let alone to phenomena that are ripe for 
metaphysical or scientific investigation, would be 
unacceptably to distort the meaning of these expressions.  
This is not because concept revision is in principle 
unacceptable, but because these particular kinds of mental 
expressions, and the kinds of explanations that they 
deliver, are perfectly in order as they are.  This becomes 
clear when close attention is paid to the way these 
expressions are used.  It is a great pity that today this 
fundamental tack is rarely discussed or even 
acknowledged. 
But an interesting trend is worth noting.  Cognitive 
science’s close relationship with analytical philosophy is 
being questioned, and as this occurs, some of 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts are getting a look-in through the 
back door.  This can be seen with respect to a project that 
has occupied most philosophers of mind in the 1980s and 
90s: to articulate a theory of mental content. 
Stephen Stich characterises one motivation for 
articulating such a theory as follows: 
A prominent feature of our everyday discourse 
about ourselves and about other people is our practice of 
identifying mental states by adverting to their content... In 
these, and in a vast range of other cases, the attribution of 
content is effortless, unproblematic, and unquestionably 
useful.  Moreover, in the typical case, there is widespread 
intersubjective agreement about these attributions.  
Plainly, there must be a mental mechanism of some 
complexity underlying this ubiquitous practice, and it 
seems plausible to suppose that the mechanism in 
question includes a store of largely tacit knowledge about 
the conditions under which it is (and is not) appropriate to 
characterize a mental state as the belief or the desire that 
p (p. 350). 
Stich suggests that a perfectly plausible goal for a 
theory of mental content would be to describe the body of 
tacit knowledge that is stored in the mechanism underlying 
our quotidian practice.  
If a theory of content is to explain how an ordinary 
person comes to an understanding of her subject by 
attributions of mental states then the theory is answerable 
to the kind of understanding that is involved, and thus the 
kind of explanation that is delivered, in common sense 
interpretive contexts.  Even if a theorist studying these 
practices is the best person to articulate what constitute 
their rules or suppositions, it is still the ordinary practices, 
explanations, and understanding they deliver that is the 
subject of investigation.  
But philosophers working on theories of mental 
content have a highly ambivalent attitude toward ordinary 
understanding.  Often, one is given the impression that the 
authority on the nature of the explanatory role of the 
mental is within the province of the cognitive sciences, 
whose theorists should not feel constrained by the remarks 
of philosophers interested in conceptual elucidation. 
Anybody tempted to appeal to ordinary language 
“intuitions” is interfering unnecessarily with a perfectly 
legitimate scientific enquiry.  
The relationship was bound to become uneasy 
between the tradition of “analytical” philosophy – which 
takes as its brief an investigation of language as a way of 
investigating thought, and philosophy-as-science – which 




wants to eschew language (especially with its tight ties to 
what the ordinary folk would say) and study the 
phenomena of thought on its own. One manifestation of 
this uneasiness is the realization that theory construction is 
not far removed from the project of conceptual analysis as 
practiced, for example, by G.E. Moore. 
Moore’s explicit characterisation of analysis – as 
the clarification of concepts – says that the verbal 
expression of analysis must follow a standard pattern of 
paraphrase in which what is analysed is logically 
equivalent to a larger, more explicit, and synonymous 
expression.  Of course the accounts of the mental we are 
concerned with were never supposed to be definitional, 
hence the demand for synonymy of expressions is no 
longer in place.  Instead, the strategy might be to suppose 
that our mental concepts fix the reference of what can be 
discovered a posteriori to be some property or set of 
properties.  On this conception, any proposed identity 
claim linking the concept with the alleged referent will not 
purport to be definitional, but rather “reforming”.  
Nonetheless, any theoretical or reforming definition might 
still be subject to the challenge that it has either left 
something essential out of the proposed reforming 
definition that is central to the concept being reformed, or 
that it has added something that it was essentially missing. 
A number of philosophers have noticed the close 
tie between theory construction that proceeds in this way 
and old-fashioned conceptual analysis and have thus 
expressed misgivings about the whole enterprise.  
Stephen Stich and Michael Tye have doubts partly on 
inductive grounds: since conceptual analysis or conceptual 
definition as Moore conceived it has, by and large, been a 
failure, then so too will reforming definitions with (in certain 
ways) even tighter constraints about what is allowed in the 
paraphrase.   
But the past failures of conceptual analysis are not 
the only grounds for pessimism.  Both Stich and Tye have 
also claimed that empirical findings support rival theories 
about the nature of the mental structures that underlie 
people’s judgments when they classify items into 
categories.  The empirical evidence shows that these 
structures do not exploit tacitly known necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  Both philosophers cite Eleanor 
Rosch’s work on prototypes as an example of such a rival 
theory and both of them mention in a footnote her 
indebtedness to Wittgenstein’s work in the Philosophical 
Investigations.  This is what I mean by a recent attention to 
Wittgenstein slipping through the back door.   
What conclusion is to be drawn from this?  Stich 
speculatively concludes that the ability to categorize 
intentional concepts will not have underlying them mental 
mechanisms that utilize “classical” concepts of the sort that 
can be defined by sets of necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  If our intuitions about whether a state has the 
content that p are constructed, and not determined by 
rules for the application of the concept but are rather 
guided in part in response to the circumstances in which 
the judgment is called for, then there are no such rules in 
the form of necessary and sufficient conditions for a theory 
of mental content to deliver.  To a student of Wittgenstein 
(and ignoring, for the moment, the reference to mental 
mechanisms), this will sound familiar.  
One would expect a concomitant rejection of the 
idea that it is the job of cognitive science to describe the 
structure of knowledge underlying people’s ordinary 
judgments about the content of intentional states.  But 
instead Stich suggests that if this is what a theory of 
mental content is for, the theorist will probably have to give 
up doing philosophy as it is traditionally conceived and 
start doing cognitive science instead (p.354). 
But how would doing cognitive science instead 
avoid what has always been the difficult questions that a 
theory of content would have to face: namely, what is to 
count as someone’s having a particular mental attitude 
with a specific content?  Or, as Wittgenstein might prefer to 
say, what counts as a successful or permissible or 
acceptable use of these mental expressions?  
Experimenters testing “underlying mechanisms” for their 
subjects’ ability to identify these states or attribute mental 
concepts have to take a stand on whether any particular 
attribution is successful before the mechanisms for 
delivering these and only these successful judgments can 
be investigated.   To reach the conclusion that concepts 
are not classical in the sense that Moore envisaged does 
not obviate the need to find out or decide what will count 
as a successful application of these concepts.  Insofar as it 
is a person’s interpretive abilities to be explained (and not 
mere habits or tendencies) we need some idea of what 
constitutes success.   
The pursuit of these answers was traditionally the 
remit of philosophy. But in a context where the focus is on 
the mental mechanisms in which the relevant bodies of 
knowledge are held to be stored, the role of the 
philosopher has become tenuous.  For is it not the 
business of an empirical psychologist to study mental 
mechanisms?  Thus both Stich and Tye agree that 
whatever the mental is, it is the job of the latter to 
investigate it. 
Stich and Tye may be right to doubt that a body of 
knowledge provides necessary and sufficient conditions 
(for something, say, to be a state with content) but they 
should – for similar reasons – also be suspicious of the 
idea that our ability to apply mental concepts has a body of 
largely tacit knowledge that “underlies” it.  How is this 
knowledge supposed to be explanatory? 
The usual supposition is that an interpreter is 
caused to deliver correct interpretations most the time 
because the rules for interpreting are embodied in “mental 
mechanisms.”  This presumably means that having the 
body of knowledge is causally sufficient to produce the 
correct answers, provided that the mechanism is not 
defective.  But if the mechanism that embodies the 
knowledge is causally sufficient to produce the right 
answers, then the content of knowledge itself, as it were, 
would have to suffice to deliver the right answers.   And 
this leads us back to the idea that the knowledge consists 
in at least sufficient conditions for the application of our 
content concepts.  Surely the rejection of a classical 
conception of concepts brings with it the rejection of the 
model of explanation that supposes that the content of 
knowledge is sufficient to determine correct interpretations.  
To put the point another way, surely the rejection of the 
idea that there are rules that determine the correct 
application of mental concepts brings with it the rejection of 
the idea that our ability to interpret is a matter of knowing 
these rules.  What room is left, then, for the idea that the 
ability to be explained amounts to a kind of information 
processing?  How is the information to be delivered and 
how is its delivery supposed to explain the ability?   
It seems that in viewing a theory of content as an 
underlying body of knowledge that is supposed to explain 
an individual’s ability to interpret, we have not moved far 
enough away from conceptual analysis. Moving far enough 
away would involve rejecting the mechanism hypothesis as 
otiose.  This will in turn allow the focus to be on the 
intersubjective agreement: why do we tend to converge on 
the ascription of mental content concepts to one and 




another, and in what do correct or permissible judgments 
consist?  These questions will be answered – to the extent 
that they can be – by paying attention to how we justify, 
defend, correct, and explain those attributions.  And this is 
just what a good Wittgensteinian should set out to do: to 
describe the “allowable moves” that can be made using 
expressions containing mental verbs.  Insofar as the focus 
of investigation is on what counts as “allowable” – as 
opposed to what is known by someone who makes the 
moves – the project would be normative in the old-
fashioned sense, but it is as far removed from the 
presuppositions of a priori conceptual analysis as the 
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